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Third-Party Standing and Abortion Providers:
The Hidden Dangers of June Medical Services
Elika Nassirinia*
ABSTRACT
Standing is a long held, judicially-created doctrine intended to establish the proper
role of courts by identifying who may bring a case in federal court. While standing usually
requires that a party asserts his or her own rights, the Supreme Court has created certain
exceptions that allow litigants to bring suit on behalf of third parties when they suffer a
concrete injury, they have a “close relation” to the third party, and there are obstacles to
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. June Medical Services, heard
by the Supreme Court on June 29, 2020, involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, a
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) law which requires abortion providers
in Louisiana to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the
providers perform abortions. This law decreased the number of abortion clinics in
Louisiana from six to three. In addition to the admitting privileges issue in the case,
Louisiana challenged the entitlement of the plaintiff-providers to third-party standing in
bringing suit, arguing that abortion providers do not meet the requirements of third-party
standing. Louisiana’s arguments pose a grave danger to reproductive rights across the
country, as the abolishment of third-party standing for abortion providers would severely
restrict the number of cases brought forth challenging abortion restrictions. Louisiana’s
arguments ignore a long line of precedent that recognizes third-party standing of abortion
providers challenging health and safety regulations, as well as the well-documented
dangers of TRAP laws to women’s health. In addition, Louisiana’s rationale rests on
inaccurate assumptions about the dynamic between abortion providers and their patients,
and disregards the very real and dangerous hindrance in the path of women seeking to file
lawsuits on their own behalf in cases involving abortion restrictions.
INTRODUCTION
2019 brought some of the strictest abortion bans in recent American history,
including bans in Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri.1 While these bans garnered national
attention and outrage, a less well-known case threatens the foundations of reproductive
rights across the country. June Medical Services v. Gee is the first abortion case taken up
*
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dedication to teaching about the law as a tool for social change has been a source of inspiration for the past
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1
K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the Procedure This Year, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/abortion-laws-states.html.
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by the Supreme Court since Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, two of Donald
Trump’s appointees, took the bench.2
June Medical involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (Act 620), a bill
requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles
of where the providers perform abortions.3 On June 12, 2014, the Governor of Louisiana
signed the Act into law, effective September 1, 2014.4 After the passage of Act 620, the
number of abortion clinics in Louisiana decreased from six to three, severely impacting
women’s5 access to abortion services in the state.6 Abortion providers in Louisiana,
including Hope Medical Group for Women, filed suit, arguing that the Act threatened their
and their patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights, and seeking injunctive
relief.7
The law at issue in June Medical is strikingly similar to the law overruled in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.8 Both Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical involve
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, which impose particularly
stringent requirements on abortion providers not required of other medical providers.9
These laws, passed under the pretense of protecting women’s health and safety,
substantially restrict access to abortion, “add nothing to existing patient protections,” and
allow “hospitals effective veto power over whether an abortion provider can exist.”10
Specifically, some TRAP laws, like Act 620 in June Medical, mandate that providers
performing abortions have relationships with local hospitals, requirements that have
negligible benefits for patient care but set nearly impossible standards for providers to
meet.11
While the admitting privileges issue of June Medical has garnered public attention,
the quieter and less glaring third-party standing challenge presented by the state of
Louisiana presents significantly more widespread and devastating potential for damage to
reproductive rights. Louisiana filed a cross-petition challenging the entitlement of the
litigants—in this case Hope Clinic as well as two physicians—to third-party standing in

2

Leah Litman, How the Court Could Limit Abortion Rights Without Overturning Roe, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/how-june-medical-services-v-gee-couldrestrict-legal-abortion/599560/.
3
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 2018).
4
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2016).
5
While this Note refers to individuals impacted by abortion restrictions as “women,” it is important to note
that individuals identifying with any gender may seek abortions and be impacted by abortion restrictions.
6
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 36 (M.D. La. 2017).
7
June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 814 F.3d at 321–22. The plaintiffs in this case consist of abortion providers in
Louisiana, including Hope Medical Group for Women, Bossier City Medical Suite, and Causeway Medical
Clinic, as well as two physicians. Id. at 319. “John Doe 1 is a physician in Family Medicine and Addiction
Medicine who performs abortions at Hope Clinic and has not obtained admitting privileges within thirty
miles of Hope. John Doe 2 is an obstetrician-gynecologist who performs abortions at Bossier and
Causeway. Doe 2 has not obtained admitting privileges within thirty miles of Bossier but has obtained
conditional privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of Causeway.” Id. at 321 n.2.
8
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (2016).
9
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2015),
https://reproductiverights.org/document/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers-trap.
10
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, Guttmacher Institute (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers.
11
Id.
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bringing suit.12 Louisiana argues that abortion providers do not meet the requirements of
third-party standing because their interests are at odds with those of patients; they do not
have a “close” relationship with patients that resembles traditional doctor-patient
relationships; and there is no absolute hindrance to the ability of third-parties, women
seeking abortions in this case, to bring suit on their own behalf.13
The Court has no basis for denying third-party standing to abortion providers in this
case. A long line of cases before June Medical established that abortion providers are
entitled to third-party standing in suits that impact the reproductive choices of their
patients, and that the traditional doctor-patient relationship is different than that developed
in other professional relationships.14 In June Medical, the State argues that the traditional
doctor-patient relationship does not exist between patients and abortion providers at all.15
This argument ignores the Court’s history of having long revered and protected the doctorpatient relationship, a history which suggests that if other individuals are privy to thirdparty standing in their professional relationships, this standing is even more warranted for
abortion providers.16 The attempt to deny abortion providers third-party standing is a thinly
veiled attempt to restrict the right to an abortion without overruling Roe.17 The denial of
third-party standing will turn the constitutional right to an abortion into a mere formality,
quietly devastating reproductive rights as we know them.
In Part I, this Note examines third-party standing criteria. Part II analyzes the three
challenges to third-party standing for abortion providers laid out by Louisiana in its
conditional cross-petition and demonstrates that they are neither supported by law nor
evidence. Lastly, Part III provides a picture of the consequences that will arise if the Court
agrees with Louisiana by ruling that providers do not have third-party standing to bring
cases on behalf of their patients.18
I.

STANDING

A. Procedural History of Third-Party Standing
Standing is a long-held, judicially-created doctrine intended to establish the proper
role of courts by identifying who may bring a case in federal court. The doctrine emerges
from Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, which grants the federal courts “[t]he
judicial power of the United States” and limits this power to hearing “cases” and
“controversies.”19

12

Conditional Cross-Petition, Gee v. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., (No. 18-1460), 2019 WL 2241856.
Id. at *22.
14
See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481
(1965).
15
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). The case was decided on June 29, 2020. Id. In
a 5-4 decision, the Court found Act 620 to be unconstitutional, as it posed an undue burden and placed a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. Id.
16
See e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
17
Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
18
June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 2103.
19
U.S. CONST art. III, § 2.
13
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In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court clarified the requirements necessary for
standing.20 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘“injury in fact’—an invasion of a
legally protected interest” which is “concrete and particularized . . . and actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”21 In other words, the injury must be clear and specific,
as opposed to a mere possibility. Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct in question.22 The injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the action
of the defendant, rather than resulting from the action of a third party not before the court. 23
Finally, it must be “likely,” as opposed to “speculative,” that the injury will be remedied
by a favorable court decision.24
Standing usually requires that a party asserts his or her own rights. However, the
Court has created certain exceptions for third parties. To establish third-party standing, a
litigant must first have suffered an “injury in fact”—a specific, concrete injury as opposed
to a hypothetical one—giving the individual a tangible interest in the outcome of the matter
in question.25 Second, the litigant must have a “close relation” to the third party.26
Third, there must be an obstacle to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests.27
B. Third-Party Standing in June Medical
In June Medical, Louisiana argues that the litigants in the case, Hope Clinic and two
physicians, do not have third-party standing to bring suit because abortion providers do not
meet the requirements of third-party standing.28 Before addressing the merits of
Louisiana’s argument against granting third-party standing, it is important to note that in
considering precedent, this issue should have been waived. Act 620 is strikingly similar to
the Act in Whole Woman’s Health, which was found unconstitutional, to the extent that the
District Court in June Medical actually invalidated Act 620 as facially unconstitutional in
light of the Whole Woman’s Health ruling.29 Given that the entirety of Louisiana’s
argument hinges on the constitutionality of Act 620, an act incredibly similar to legislation
the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional in Whole Women’s Health, the issue of
Act 620’s constitutionally should have been waived as the act was now unconstitutional on
its face.
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court found that two provisions in Texas House Bill
2 (HB 2) were unconstitutional.30 The first provision required that physicians performing
abortions have admitting-privileges at a hospital no further than thirty miles away from the
abortion facility on the day of the procedure, decreasing the number of clinics providing
20

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Other cases examining the issue of standing
include Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 408 (2013); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
21
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 561.
25
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12.
29
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017).
30
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (2016).
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abortions in Texas from forty-two to nineteen.31 The second provision required that the
center meet the standards for an ambulatory surgical center.32 The Court in Whole Woman’s
Health ruled that both provisions of HB 2 placed a “substantial obstacle” in the path of
women seeking abortions and constituted an “undue burden,” rendering the requirements
unconstitutional.33
While the District Court in June Medical found Act 620 facially unconstitutional in
light of Whole Woman’s Health, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that Act
620 did not “impose a substantial burden on a large fraction of women,” rendering it
constitutional.34 Louisiana objected to the granting of third-party standing to providers for
the first time almost five years into litigation, and only after the Supreme Court granted
plaintiffs’ emergency application to stay the Fifth Circuit’s decision finding Act 620
constitutional.35 The timing of Louisiana’s argument is suspicious because it asks the Court
to conduct a de novo review of evidence “cherry-picked” from the extensive trial record.36
Louisiana’s arguments against granting third-party standing were not analyzed in lower
courts, and the District Court found no facts supporting the state’s objections to providers’
standing, ruling that Louisiana’s arguments on this point failed.37 In addition, federal courts
have already thoroughly investigated the issues raised in this claim.38 While all of these
factors suggest the third-party standing objection should be subject to waiver, this Note
will assume that the state has not waived this issue.
II.

LOUISIANA’S CHALLENGE

Louisiana makes three challenges to the third-party standing of abortion providers in
June Medical. Louisiana first argues that the plaintiffs’ interest “conflict[s]” with those of
their patients because the plaintiffs’ interest is to reduce the number of regulations on
abortion while providing “as many abortions as possible.”39 Second, Louisiana argues that
the relationship between the providers and their patients lacks the sufficient “closeness” of
a traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is thus nonexistent.40 Third, Louisiana argues
that there is no evidence of a “hindrance” to women seeking abortions to represent
themselves in these cases and bring suit.41
A. Conflict of Interest
In June Medical, Louisiana argues on behalf of Act 620. Act 620 requires abortion
providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the
providers perform abortions, and has decreased the number of abortion clinics in Louisiana
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 2298.
34
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 805 (5th Cir. 2018).
35
Opposition to Conditional Cross-Petition, Gee v. June Medical Services, (No. 18-1460), 2019 WL
2241856, at *8.
36
Id.
37
Id. at *9.
38
Id.
39
Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12 at *25.
40
Id. at *22.
41
Id.
32
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from six to three, severely restricting women’s access to abortion services.42 The plaintiffproviders in this case are abortion providers in Louisiana who argue that the Act is
unconstitutional, and threatens their and their patients’ procedural and substantive due
process rights, while Louisiana asserts that Act 620 is constitutional.43
Louisiana first claims that plaintiffs’ interests as abortion providers conflict with the
interests of their patients.44 Louisiana argues the plaintiff-providers’ interest is to reduce
the medical providers’ “present and future compliance obligations” and provide “as many
abortions as possible,” whereas patients primarily have an interest in safety by getting an
abortion from doctors with admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where
the providers perform abortions.45 Louisiana argues that adopting Act 620 would improve
the quality of patient care and protect women’s health, leading physicians to adopt a level
of care higher than they “would otherwise provide.”46 This argument assumes not only that
abortion is an inherently risky procedure, but that the level of care provided to patients is
inadequate and will further degrade without state intervention. However, study after study
has revealed that abortion is an extremely safe medical procedure that carries little or no
risk of “fertility-related problems, cancer or psychological illnesses,” and that TRAP laws,
such as Act 620, and other regulations, presented under the guise of protecting the health
and safety of women, compromise women’s access to abortions without actually increasing
the safety of the procedure.47 Louisiana argues that doctors and patients have an inherent
conflict of interest concerning health and safety regulations, a conflict that exists regardless
of the merits of how much Act 620 serves patient health and safety.
Louisiana’s rationale rests on inaccurate assumptions about the doctor-patient
dynamic. First, the assumption that doctors and patients have a conflict of interest regarding
health regulations is logically flawed. Physicians are bound by ethical guidelines that
require them to prioritize the health and safety of their patients. 48 In addition, the district
court found that in the decades before the passage of Act 620, abortion in Louisiana was
“extremely safe,” and that this safety was reflected in the records of the clinic and two
physicians who brought suit in this case.49
42

June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 36 (M.D. La. 2017).
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2016).
44
Id.
45
Id. at *25.
46
Id.
47
Heather D. Boonstra, Rachel Benson Gold, Cory L. Richards & Lawrence B. Finer, Abortion in Women’s
Lives, Guttmacher Institute (2006), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-womens-lives (“Induced
abortion in the United States is now an extremely safe procedure; injuries and deaths from abortion are
rare.”). See also Mads Melbye, Jan Wohlfahrt, Jorgen H. Olsen, Morten Frisch, Tine Westergaard, Karin
Helweg-Larsen & Per Kragh Andersen, Induced Abortion and The Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 81-85 (1997) (Finding no link between abortion and breast cancer.); News Release, The
Quality of Abortion Care Depends on Where a Woman Lives, Says One of Most Comprehensive Reviews of
Research on Safety and Quality of Abortion Care in the
U.S., NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED. (Mar.16, 2018), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/n
ewsitem.aspx?RecordID=24950 (Finding that having an abortion does not increase a woman’s risk of
“secondary infertility, pregnancy-related hypertensive disorders, preterm birth, breast cancer, or mental
health disorders such as depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder,” and that “abortion-specific
regulations” create barriers to “safe and effective care.”).
48
Code of Medical Ethics Overview, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2019), https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview.
49
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017).
43
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In addition, TRAP laws are damaging. A 2016 study in Critical Public Health found
that laws such as Act 620 damage patient care, harm which providers must then work to
minimize.50 Researchers focused on providers in North Carolina after the passage of House
Bill 854 (HB 854), a TRAP law that mandated patients receive counseling with statedetermined information as well as a twenty-four-hour waiting period between counseling
and the procedure.51 Researchers found that most providers made changes not only to meet
HB 854’s legal requirements, but also to “minimize the burden of the law” on patients.52
Providers chose to implement measures that eased the difficulties posed by HB 854 on their
patients, but required the providers themselves to perform substantial amounts of “invisible
labor” in order to minimize this burden.53
Providers offered telephone counseling rather than requiring multiple clinic visits, a
measure that, although beneficial for patients, imposed considerable financial, time, and
labor costs for providers.54 Some practices hired additional staff while others extended the
hours of existing staff to meet demands, with one physician choosing to take calls at all
hours of the day, even while at home, to facilitate patient access. 55 Providers described
working more uncompensated hours to meet the law’s requirements, and physicians
performed work not typically taken on by those in their profession, such as answering
phones and making appointments for patients.56 In addition, providers generally absorbed
both the financial and time burden of these changes, without increasing their prices for
patients to compensate for the additional costs.57 Providers stated that passing the financial
burden onto patients would have been “not fair” or “unkind,” given that patients already
struggled to pay for these procedures.58
The study concludes that TRAP laws harm patients, but also suggests that providers
place patient care above their own interests. Not only do providers not hold interests that
conflict with those of their patients, but they act as barriers between their patients and the
harms created by laws such as Act 620, thus revealing that their interests are far more
aligned with their patients’ than Louisiana suggests. Many providers in the study also
described feeling emotionally burdened by the law due to their concern that it was “harmful
to women.”59 Providers felt frustrated that the regulation was “unnecessary,” “irrelevant,”
and led them to balance compliance with the law’s requirements against their commitment
to provide high quality, responsible medical care.60 The conflict of interest described by
Louisiana is not between providers and their patients, but the combined interest of patients
and providers against laws that jeopardize reproductive care and safety.
In addition, studies have repeatedly shown that TRAP laws such as Act 620 hold no
benefits for patient safety. In a recent study analyzing induced abortions among 49,287
50

Rebecca J. Mercier, Mara Buchbinder, Amy Bryant, TRAP Laws and the Invisible Labor of US Abortion
Providers, 26 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2016).
51
Id. at 5.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 6.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 7.
60
Id.
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women, researchers found that performance of the abortion in an ambulatory surgery center
compared to an office setting was not associated with a significant difference in morbidity
and adverse events,61 demonstrating that many “safety” regulations are unsupported by
science. Therefore, even if providers have interests different from their patients, TRAP
laws do nothing to protect patients’ interests or to keep them safe in the face of supposedly
dangerous, irresponsible providers. In addition, by impeding women’s access to abortion,
TRAP laws delay the procedure, causing women to face greater medical risk than they
would have had they been able to access the procedure earlier.62 Though abortion is
extremely safe at any point during pregnancy, the risk of complications from abortion
increases later in pregnancy, with the risk of death associated with abortion rising from 0.3
deaths for every 100,000 abortions at or before eight weeks to 6.7 deaths at 18 weeks or
later.63 TRAP laws not only fail to increase patient safety, but endanger patients.
Professional duties and standards aside, a somewhat cynical line of reasoning further
demonstrates that physicians have no reason to be at odds with regulations that truly protect
the health and safety of their patients. As with many other professions, a physician’s
professional reputation is vital to the financial success of her practice.64 Physicians benefit
professionally from complying with regulations that protect the health and safety of their
patients, not out of the goodness of their hearts, but out of a desire for financial success.
Perhaps the resistance of providers to these regulations is evidence that the regulations do
nothing for the health and safety of the women they proclaim to protect.65
In addition, Louisiana’s argument ignores a long line of precedent that recognizes
third-party standing of abortion providers challenging health and safety regulations, as
petitioners demonstrate in their response to the cross-petition.66 In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme Court found that physicians had standing to
challenge an abortion ban that imposed criminal liability on providers for failure to comply
with regulations such as requiring spousal support or parental consent for minors, defining
fetal viability, and requiring reporting and recordkeeping of patients from physicians and
clinics.67 In City of Akron, the Court allowed physicians to challenge a health regulation
that required second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals.68 And, in Doe v.
Bolton, the Court allowed physicians to bring suit on behalf of their patients to challenge
laws that required abortions to be performed at accredited hospitals for the supposed health
61

Sarah C. M. Roberts, Ushma D. Upadhyay, Guodong Liu, Jennifer L. Kerns, Djibril Ba, Nancy Beam &
Douglas L. Leslie, Association of Facility Type with Procedural-Related Morbidities and Adverse Events
Among Patients Undergoing Induced Abortions, 319 JAMA 2497, 2501 (June 26, 2018).
62
Suzanne Zane, Andreea A. Creanga, Cynthia J. Berg, Karen Pazol, Danielle B. Suchdev, Denise J.
Jamieson & William M. Callaghan, Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States: 1998–2010, 126
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 258, 260 (Aug. 2015).
63
Id. at 262.
64
Jonathan Catley, A Doctor's Reputation Means Everything: How to Protect Yours, MD CONNECT (Sep.
30, 2014, 1:40 PM), https://www.mdconnectinc.com/medical-marketing-insights/bid/76854/A-Doctor-sReputation-Means-Everything-How-to-.
65
Mercier, supra note 50.
66
Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12.
67
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976).
68
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983) (“There can be no
doubt that § 1870.03's second trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle in the path
of women seeking an abortion. A primary burden created by the requirement is additional cost to the
woman.”).
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of women, again revealing the Court’s receptivity to allowing abortion providers thirdparty standing.69
Lower courts have also found providers to have third-party standing when bringing
suit on behalf of their patients, generally rejecting the conflict of interest theory presented
by Louisiana. In Abbott, the Fifth Circuit, to which Louisiana also belongs, rejected a
conflict of interest challenge to an admitting privilege law.70 The Ninth Circuit in
McCormack rejected a conflict of interest argument built upon a lack of commitment from
physicians to patient safety. This argument is directly presented in June Medical, where
Louisiana both asserts that health regulations are at odds with the interests of providers,
and subsequently attacks the safety record, commitment, and qualifications of providers.71
The Seventh Circuit, in Charles, rejected the argument that a conflict of interest existed
between patients and providers because abortion regulations were created to protect women
from “abusive medical practices,” finding providers were sincerely concerned about the
wellbeing of their patients.72 And perhaps most succinctly, in Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit asserted that the interests of providers and patients are the
same because women who want abortions are seeking the same thing clinics are seeking.73
Ultimately, Louisiana’s claim that the interests of patients and abortion providers are at
odds holds no basis and has been explicitly rejected in past decisions.
B. Closeness in Relationship
Louisiana next claims that abortion providers are not entitled to third-party standing
because they lack the “close relationship” with their patients that is traditionally found in
doctor-patient relationships.74 Louisiana’s claims follow a long-standing trend of
governmental actors treating abortion providers with distrust and barely-concealed
disgust.75 Historically, society has not considered these providers real doctors, instead
viewing them as “abortion doctors” who will harm women and trick them into undergoing
abortions unless the state steps in and protects women from the providers’ greedy,
untrustworthy hands.76 Louisiana claims this, in the face of overwhelming evidence that
abortion is incredibly safe and that providers inform women of their options and in no way
pressure them to have abortions. Regardless, Louisiana argues abortion providers and
patients do not have a “close relationship,” contending that the nature of the relationship
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (“The physician is the one against whom these criminal statutes
directly operate,” and, therefore, faced a “sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment” to justify
standing.).
70
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 586–87 (5th Cir.
2014).
71
McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2015).
72
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1980).
73
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013).
74
Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12, at 22.
75
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2007); Solomon Posen, The Doctor in Literature:
The Abortion and the Abortionist, HEKTOEN INT’L J. MED. HUMAN. (2011),
https://hekint.org/2017/03/04/the-doctor-in-literature-the-abortion-and-the-abortionist/ (Abortion providers
in literature are portrayed as “physically and intellectually repulsive” individuals, often drunkards with
“lecherous tendencies” and ignorant of basic principles of hygiene.).
76
See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1614 (linking a graphic description of the abortion process to Congress’s
legislation blocking respondent “abortion doctors” from “knowingly” performing “[un]necessary”
abortions).
69
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between abortion providers and patients is wholly different than that of a traditional doctorpatient relationship.77 This bias is clear in Louisiana’s description of the work of abortion
providers as those who Louisiana says “perform very brief procedures on drugged patients
whom they never saw before and will never see again.”78
Yet, abortion providers, like physicians in every other field, consult with their
patients, explain their patients’ options, inform their patients about the procedures and the
related risks, and make themselves available for any questions or concerns after the
procedure has been completed. The safety of abortions perhaps lessens the patient’s need
to contact her doctor after the procedure. Additionally, the nature of abortions, in which
the need for them often only arises in the event of an unplanned pregnancy, renders
significant advanced planning or numerous prior physician meetings unworkable and
unnecessary. Yet, neither the safety nor nature of abortions take away from the doctorpatient relationship.
The relationship between emergency medicine doctors and their patients, for
example, despite its similarities to women and abortion providers, is societally considered
a valid doctor-patient relationship. Many women do not openly speak about their abortion,
due to the persistent social stigma around abortion, as well as the threat of facing
harassment if others become aware of their decision. Instead, many women underreport
and intentionally misclassify abortion procedures, which results in further misconceptions
about the prevalence of abortion, to the extent that only 35%-60% of actual abortions are
reported in surveys.79 This sets the procedure apart from other, even significantly more
dangerous procedures, such as childbirth or an organ transplant, because societally, these
other procedures are not frowned upon or frequently met with shame or secrecy. As such,
a woman seeking an abortion reasonably trusts her provider to deliver medical care rising
to the doctor-patient level. Even more, she trusts her provider to perform perhaps the most
stigmatized medical procedure in American society safely, expertly, and without judgment.
She places her trust in her provider at a time when she is vulnerable to judgment and stigma,
strengthening the doctor-patient bond.
In addition, abortion providers face a significant toll, demonstrating that these
individuals are so dedicated to providing patients with care that they are willing to make
significant personal and professional sacrifices. Many providers experience “career
burnout,” face harassment by anti-choice individuals, have their occupation and role as
physicians questioned and demeaned by society at large, are presented with constant
restrictions that impede their ability to provide healthcare, and sometimes are berated for
their professional roles by the very patients who seek and gladly accept their services. 80
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From 2010 to 2018, abortion providers nationwide reported 471 cases of vandalism, 2,826
cases of trespassing, 108 cases of assault and battery, and 259 death threats.81 During these
years, providers experienced a total of 3,991 instances of violence, in addition to 406,733
instances of disruption, revealing the constant stream of threats, harassment, and violence
abortion providers face as a result of the much needed service they provide.82 Not only do
these providers face violence and harassment, they are also met with professional stigma,
both by patients and colleagues. In a 2012 study analyzing attitudes regarding the
legitimacy of the work of abortion providers, providers reported feeling “looked down
upon” by patients and medical colleagues and being judged as “deficient,” both “morally
and technically.”83 In addition, providers reported feeling that colleagues viewed them as
occupying the “low ground” on the moral plane of medicine and “less technically
competent” than doctors who make different career choices.84
Despite attempts by the anti-choice movement to vilify abortion providers, these
providers endure danger, exhaustion, and a lack of professional regard in order to provide
their patients with safe and confidential healthcare during a time when patients are
particularly vulnerable. If the “traditional doctor-patient relationship” means anything, it is
the willingness of the physician to place her patient’s health, safety, and well-being above
all else, ethical regulations permitting. Abortion providers have demonstrated this, even in
the face of harassment, threats to their lives, and a repeated unwillingness for their
professional capability and trustworthiness to be taken seriously. Their willingness to file
suit on behalf of their patients, individuals who, given statistics regarding women most
impacted by TRAP laws, often lack the time, resources, or physical capacity to file suit
themselves, suggests that abortion providers not only meet the standards of the traditional
doctor-patient relationship, but exceed it, thus satisfying the “closeness” requirement for
third-party standing.85
Perhaps most importantly, Louisiana’s definition of closeness is at odds with how
the Court has defined such a relationship. The Court has traditionally found that a close
relationship exists when the enforcement of the law in question against the litigant would
be “indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.”86 In Roe, the seminal abortion case
in United States history, the Court found that the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment provides a “right of privacy” that protects a woman’s right to have an abortion,
a right that is balanced against the state’s interest in preserving a woman’s health as well
as its interest in potential life.87 The impact of Act 620, however, is directly at odds with
pretends to not recognize the patient. Id. When asked if she felt any desire to “out” the protestor, she replies
no, and that her only thought was, “Looks like you recovered well. Good for safe and legal abortion.” Id.
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the right established in Roe to safe, legal abortions for those who seek them within limited
time frames.88 Enforcement of Act 620 against providers would drastically restrict
women’s access to abortion. The district court found that Act 620 would result in a
“substantial” number of women being denied access to abortion and “delays in care” that
would increase complications, as well as “unlicensed and unsafe abortions.”89 Louisiana’s
claim that abortion providers and patients do not share a “close” enough relationship for
third-party standing thus does not hold merit.
Interestingly, Louisiana claims that plaintiffs are mere “vendors of abortion
services.”90 Louisiana attempts to distinguish this case from myriad others asserting that
vendors of products and services, due to the economic impact of regulations, have thirdparty standing to assert the rights of their customers. In Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court
held that beer vendors had third-party standing to assert the equal protection rights of their
customers, who faced differences in whether they could purchase near-beer, a beverage
with a lower alcohol content than beer, based on their age.91 Louisiana, however, asserts
that it is a “long step” from an ordinary vendor protecting the rights of his customers to a
doctor “representing a patient’s interest in safety,” when the patient is making one of the
“most ‘grave’” decisions she could ever make.92 In effect, Louisiana attacks abortion
providers’ relationship with their patients by suggesting providers are only vendors, thus
refusing them status as doctors, while also refusing providers the third-party standing
afforded to vendors to sue on behalf of their customers. If abortion providers were
considered vendors, their interests would be at odds with those of their patients, suggesting
that they do not have a close doctor-patient relationship. Yet, Louisiana cannot frame
abortion providers as vendors, because courts have categorically granted third-party
standing to vendors asserting the rights of their consumers.
Courts traditionally grant vendors, including pharmaceutical companies, beer
manufacturers, lottery ticket sellers, and gun manufacturers third-party standing due to the
economic injury they will suffer as a result of regulations.93 The language in these decisions
indicates that when a regulation has substantial impact on the vendor, he or she is granted
third-party standing. There are three requirements for third-party standing to be granted to
a vendor. First, the regulation must be one that is particularly directed at a vendor; second,
it must require the vendor to make significant changes in his or her everyday practices and
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to incur a “direct economic injury” against the vendor; and third, it must expose him or her
to “heavy economic injury” or “loss of license” for failure to comply.94
As previously discussed, TRAP laws such as Act 620 are not only directed at abortion
providers but force abortion providers to change their everyday practices and incur
economic harm as a result of these changes. In addition, providers are exposed to heavy
penalties for failure to comply with these regulations, penalties which satisfy precedent’s
requirements for a vendor to hold third-party standing in challenging a regulation due to
economic injury.95 As such, abortion providers should have third-party standing to
challenge TRAP laws such as Act 620 due to economic injury alone, invalidating
Louisiana’s claim that providers lack standing because they are “vendors” of abortion
services.96 Not only have economic injuries proven sufficient for parties to establish thirdparty standing, but non-economic injuries for “professional,” “aesthetic,” “social,” and
“political” harm have similarly proven enough.97 The fact that providers clearly suffer
economic injuries as a result of TRAP laws, and suffer injury to their professional lives as
a result of these restrictions, strengthens providers’ claim to third-party standing.
In addition, courts grant medical professionals third-party standing in a manner they
have not granted to individuals in other professions, such as lawyers, suggesting that this
standing is particularly favored for physician-patient relationships.98 Louisiana’s claim is
further undermined by a line of cases that recognize the role of providers as both vendors
and health professionals.99 These cases found no issue with the coexistence of economic
stake and the doctor-patient relationship that would warrant a denial of third-party standing
for abortion providers.100 If anything, the combined role of providers as both vendors and
individuals privy to a close, confidential relationship with their patients renders them more
entitled to third-party standing than those in any other profession.
C. Hindrance
Lastly, Louisiana argues that there is no evidence of a “hindrance” in the path of
women seeking abortions to represent themselves in cases involving abortion
restrictions.101 Of all well-publicized abortion cases since the legalization of abortion, Roe
is the only case brought by a pregnant woman alone (instead of by abortion providers or a
team of the woman and providers).102 Roe formalized the right to an abortion.103 Therefore,
it makes sense that Roe was brought by a single petitioner seeking an abortion, and later
cases were brought under the abortion rights Roe granted to providers and women. Notably,
the case took several years, and by the time it was decided, the plaintiff had already given
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birth and in-turn was denied the opportunity to get an abortion.104 Pregnant women, in
particular, face challenges that make filing cases on their own incredibly challenging.
These include the lengthiness of the process, made especially glaring given the limited
timeline of pregnancy, as well as the knowledge and resources it takes to bring forth a legal
challenge.
In Louisiana, the number of abortion clinics decreased from six to three after the
passage of Act 620.105 The reduction in abortion clinics dramatically increased the distance
some Louisiana women were forced to travel to obtain an abortion, making the procedure
unfeasible for women who did not have the means to travel such distances or receive time
off from work.106 This burden on women reveals the dangers of TRAP laws that are not
challenged before or immediately after they go into effect. While the decrease in abortion
clinics may suggest that more women may be willing to sue, given how severely their
access to abortion has been limited, the women most affected by Act 620 presumably do
not have the resources to sue and likely are placed under added stress due to the increased
difficulty of attaining care. The poorer these women the greater difficulty they will have in
reaching the three available clinics, suggesting that unless providers step in on behalf of
these women, they will continue to suffer without the opportunity to realistically advocate
for themselves.
TRAP laws also disproportionately impact certain women due to race and economic
status, rendering particular groups of women even more vulnerable in the absence of thirdparty standing.107 A study tracing the number of abortions per 1,000 women between 2014–
2017 revealed vast disparities across individuals seeking abortions based on race as well
as income level.108 In 2017 alone, about 27 per 1,000 black women had abortions, compared
to approximately 18 Hispanic and 10 white women, revealing that women of color seek
abortions at significantly higher rates than white women.109 The study also revealed steep
differences among women seeking abortions based on income level, finding that in 2017
alone, 49% of abortion patients fell below the federal poverty level, while 26% of patients
fell one to two times above the federal poverty level.110 Thus, stripping providers of thirdparty standing will not only hinder all women seeking abortions, but will especially harm
women of color and low-income women—groups already marginalized due to centuries of
racism and income disparity.
The groups of historically marginalized women most directly impacted by TRAP
laws also face barriers to suing on their own behalf. While these women have fewer
economic resources to shoulder the increased distances and time costs TRAP laws impose
on them, such fewer resources also make bringing a lawsuit—a process that is both
expensive and time-consuming—more difficult. Third-party standing for providers is
therefore critical in providing these women with a legal voice when societal barriers have
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realistically stripped them of one, allowing cases to come forward that would otherwise be
impossible.
Women who face barriers to accessing legal abortion may be more likely to turn to
self-induced abortions.111 Accordingly, the removal of third-party standing for providers,
and the subsequent barrier this will place in the path of women seeking abortion, will place
the health and well-being of already vulnerable women in severe danger, exposing them to
the possibility of death encountered before Roe.112 In regions of the world where abortion
is illegal, botched abortions cause about 8%-11% of all maternal deaths; in Brazil alone,
where abortion is unlawful, approximately 200 women die due to abortion complications
each year.113 Contrary to Louisiana’s argument in June Medical, self-induced botched
abortions are direct evidence of a “hindrance” to women seeking abortions representing
themselves.114 Women who experience health complications due to unplanned
pregnancies, both mentally and physically, are clearly hindered from pursuing timely legal
action.
In addition, the sheer number of women who seek abortions in the United States
renders Louisiana’s June Medical argument that there is no hindrance to legal
representation invalid. Studies suggest that each year, more than six million American
women become pregnant, and almost half of those pregnancies are unintentional.115 Hence,
nearly half of all American women will face an unintended pregnancy at some point in
their lives, amounting to nearly three million unintentional pregnancies a year.116 If
providers are stripped of third-party standing, as Louisiana wishes them to be, three million
women each year will be vulnerable to having their choices restricted in some manner,
such as an inability to have an abortion or a delay in procuring the procedure.117 These
numbers are so large that any argument that no hindrance exists, such as the availability of
legal representation, is not only ignorant but dangerous.
Also, from a practical standpoint, abortion is a time-sensitive procedure. Forcing
women to bring challenges against abortion restrictions such as Act 620 given the length
of legal cases, which often span years, substantially hinders women’s ability to bring such
cases because their pregnancy will likely be over by the time the case goes to court.
Knowing that these challenges will have no benefit for themselves in their particular
pregnancy, women may be less likely to file lawsuits, allowing unconstitutional abortion
restrictions to continue without pushback.
Lastly, abortion providers are effective advocates for women. While third-party
standing has a complex and inconsistent history, the majority of decisions place “special
importance” on whether the litigant will be an “effective advocate” for the third party’s
rights.118 In this regard, courts have repeatedly found abortion providers to be effective
111
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advocates for women. Abortion providers understand the impact of abortion regulations on
patients on an unparalleled level because these regulations impact their daily work.
Abortion providers meet with these women, perform procedures the women seek, and
understand the harm that results when women are denied an extremely safe procedure that
they as patients decided was the best choice for them. Providers also have access to
resources patients do not, allowing them to advocate for women who are often unable to
advocate for themselves. Not only will stripping providers of third-party standing hinder
women’s access to abortion, it will take away the ability to bring cases on behalf of these
women by the very individuals best suited to do so.
III.

IMPLICATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

Though Louisiana’s arguments for denying abortion providers third-party standing
holds no merit, the hostility toward reproductive rights in today’s political climate may
overcome the years of precedent upholding third-party standing in these cases. The thirdparty standing question posed by June Medical has the potential to devastate reproductive
rights quietly. Abortion cases and outcomes are debated and subjected to public attention,
yet the legal mechanisms through which these cases emerge are often unacknowledged.
The public hears about these cases and discusses them, but June Medical threatens a future
filled with near silence. This will be a future in which hearing about an abortion case will
be a rarity. And, frighteningly, this silence may be perceived as improvement, showing that
things have gotten better. A future without third-party standing for abortion providers will
be a future of silent suffering, one where the reasons for the silence will be unclear and the
communication of the suffering nearly impossible.
Perhaps then, the only remedy is to speak—to acknowledge the legal mechanisms
such as standing that allow for cases to exist, to bring attention to these mechanisms, and
to recognize that the right to abortion is far more nuanced than agreeing or disagreeing with
Roe. The only remedy to abortion stigma is speech: speech that allows women to
understand that they are not alone, normalizes abortion as a common medical procedure,
pushes back against the vilification of abortion providers, and allows for the nuances
underlying the right to abortion to be heard and fought for, as opposed to buried under the
weight of silence and shame. For women most affected by abortion restrictions, the best
opportunity to have this speech heard in the legal arena is through providers. With thirdparty status, providers hold the ability to speak on behalf of these women, preventing their
voices, their health, and their humanity from being muted by a hostile society.
IV.

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES HOLDING

On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on June Medical Services
L.L.C. v. Russo.119 In a 5-4 decision, the Court found Act 620 to be unconstitutional,
agreeing with the District Court’s findings that the regulation posed an “undue burden” and
placed a “substantial obstacle” in the path of women seeking an abortion.120 The facts in
address the third-party’s ability to assert their own rights, while some lower courts have required a
significant obstacle in the assertion of these rights to grant standing).
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this case, according to the Court, mirrored those made in Whole Women’s Health in “every
relevant aspect,” and as such “[required] the same result.”121
Addressing the State’s third-party standing challenge, the Court took issue with the
State’s failure to mention its objection to third-party standing for abortion providers until
it had filed its cross-petition, which was more than five years after it had argued that the
plaintiffs’ standing was “beyond question.”122 As such, the State's “unmistakable
concession” of standing barred consideration of the issue in the opinion.123 Further, even
in the absence of this issue, the Court asserted that it had “long permitted” abortion
providers to invoke the rights of their “actual or potential patients” in challenging abortion
regulations.124 In cases where the enforcement of the regulation against the litigant would
indirectly harm third parties, the Court has generally permitted plaintiffs to assert thirdparty rights, as they are the “obvious claimant” and “the least awkward challenger”
impacted by the regulation.125
The Court found that the case in question “lies at the intersection of these two lines
of precedent.” Firstly, the plaintiffs are providers challenging a law that “regulates their
conduct.”126 Secondly, because they must actually apply and maintain admitting privileges,
plaintiffs are “far better positioned than their patients to address the burdens of
compliance,” making them the most obvious claimants in the case.127 The plurality,
addressing the dissent’s assertion that this case was different given that the plaintiffs
challenged a law enacted to “protect the women whose rights they are asserting,” found
that this is a “common feature” of cases in which the Court had found third-party standing.
Citing cases such as Akron and Doe, the plurality asserted that this was far from the first
abortion case to address provider standing to challenge regulations supposedly meant to
protect women.128 As such, the State’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing was
foreclosed.129
CONCLUSION
June Medical involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (Act 620). Act 620
requires abortion providers in Louisiana to have admitting privileges at a hospital within
thirty miles of where the providers perform abortions, and has decreased the number of
abortion clinics in Louisiana from six to three, severely impacting women’s access to
abortion services in the state.130 In addition to the admitting privileges issue in the case,
Louisiana filed a cross-petition challenging the entitlement of the plaintiff-providers to
third-party standing in bringing suit, arguing that abortion providers do not meet the
requirements of third-party standing because their interests are at odds with those of
patients, they lack a traditional doctor-patient relationship, and there is no hindrance to the
121
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ability of third-parties, in this case women seeking abortions, to bring suit on their own
behalf.131
Louisiana’s arguments, however, lack merit, as they ignore a long line of precedent
that recognizes third-party standing of abortion providers challenging health and safety
regulations, as well as the well-documented danger of TRAP laws to women’s health. In
addition, Louisiana’s rationale rests on inaccurate assumptions about the doctor-patient
dynamic, disregarding the commitment of abortion providers to their patients, and ignores
the very real and dangerous hindrance in the path of women seeking to file lawsuits on
their own behalf in cases involving abortion restrictions.
While the Court’s ruling in June Medical demonstrates a hopeful commitment to
precedent regarding reproductive rights, with the recent appointment of Amy Coney
Barrett to the Supreme Court, and ongoing anti-choice efforts across the country, the future
of reproductive rights remains in jeopardy. Threats to reproductive rights are dangerous
attacks on autonomy. As Justice Ginsburg stated in her 1993 Senate confirmation hearings,
“The decision whether or not to bear a child is central to a woman’s life, to her wellbeing and dignity . . . When government controls that decision for her, she is being
treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her own choices.” 132
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